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Me chamo Rogério Rocha. Sou maranhense da cidade de São Luís, mas na verdade me sinto um cidadão do mundo. Sou pós-graduado em Direito Constitucional (Universidade Anhanguera-Uniderp-LFG), pós-graduado em Ética (IESMA), Graduado em Filosofia e Direito (UFMA), mestrando em Criminologia na Universidade Fernando Pessoa (Porto/Portugal). Atualmente sou Servidor do Poder Judiciário do meu estado. Exerci a advocacia durante 6 anos de minha vida,atuando nas áreas de Direito Civil (Família), Direito do Trabalho e do Consumidor. Fui professor do CEFET- MA (atual IFMA) por 2 anos, período em que lecionei tanto para o ensino médio quanto para os alunos de áreas técnicas as disciplinas de Sociologia, Filosofia e Metodologia do Trabalho Científico. Escrevo poesias desde os 12 anos de idade. Homem livre e de bons costumes, amante da música, da arte, da história e de viagens. Obs.: Postgraduate in Constitutional Law (University Anhanguera-Uniderp-LFG), Postgraduate in Ethics (IESM), graduated in Philosophy and Law (College); Public Server at Judiciary Power, Teacher, Poet.

quinta-feira, 23 de janeiro de 2014

Constitutional Dialogues in Italy (Diálogos Constitucionais na Itália)

Constitutional Dialogues in Italy
–Francesco Duranti, Università per Stranieri di Perugia (Italy)

On January 13, the Italian Constitutional Court issued a judgment on the electoral law (no. 270/2005) for both Houses of Parliament (Camera dei Deputati, the Lower House; and Senato della Repubblica, the Upper House)[1].

In its decision—announced in a short press release on December 4, 2013[2]—the Court struck down two very contested aspects of this electoral law, namely the majority prize (premio di maggioranza) and the closed-list of party candidates running for election (liste bloccate). The first mechanism gives extra seats to the party (or to the coalition of parties) that receives most votes (at national level, in the Lower House; and at the regional level, in each of the 20 Regions, in the Upper House). The second prevents voters from choosing their own parliamentary representatives, giving them only the option of choosing a party list, in which candidates are ranked in order of electoral priority by party leaders.[3]

The Court ruled that the majority prize is unconstitutional because is violates the principles of popular sovereignty (art. 1 Const.), equality before the law (art. 3 Const.) and equality of the vote (art. 48 Const.).[4] The Court also found that closed-list system violates the principle of the freedom of the vote (same art. 48 Const.).

The Court’s judgment is very interesting in many ways, especially from constitutional and institutional domestic points of view, not to mention for the political consequences that it will entail.


From a comparative constitutional law perspective, two themes emerge from the judgment

I. Dialogue with Parliament

The Court observed in its judgment that this outcome was, to a large extent, inevitable, due to the legislative inertia following two “early warnings” the Court gave Parliament about the electoral law, one in 2008 (decisions no. 15-16/2008) and one in 2012 (decision no. 13/2012).[5]

So here the Court, called again to review the constitutionality of the electoral law for the two Chambers of Parliament, had only to point out the legislative inertia on the matter and consequently declare the provisions unconstitutional.

Reviewing the constitutionality of electoral laws in Italy is a sensitive political question, perhaps, like in other parts of the world, the most sensitive. The Court must strike a delicate balance between its duty to engage in judicial review and to respect the legislature’s right to make political choices which it considers to be in the best interests of the country, especially where, like in Italy, the electoral system is not directly enshrined in the Constitution.[6]

In this case, the Court engaged in a long dialogue with Parliament, starting with a judgment of 2008, with two formal warnings (the other one in 2012) about the incompatibility of part of the new electoral system with some fundamental features and principles of the Constitution. In engaging in this dialogue, the Court reflected something analogous, in comparative terms, to weak-form constitutional review—or the “new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism”[7]—where judicial/legislative dialogue “allow courts to inform a legislature of the courts’ understanding of the constitutional provision, while allowing the legislature to respond and take conclusive action based in its own understanding.”[8]

In the aftermath of the Court’s judgment, Parliament may now speak, if it wishes, with a wide margin of legislative discretion. Parliament can revise the current electoral system, or choose an entirely new one, subject to the limits imposed by the Court.

II. Dialogue with foreign Constitutional Courts

The Court also engaged in an interesting dialogue with other Constitutional Courts, namely the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany), citing three of its judgments, the most recent one being decision no. 3/11 of July 25, 2012,[9] on the constitutionality of some provisions of the law for the Federal Parliament of Germany (Bundestag).

On the premise that the proportionality test is a common and shared practice between European Constitutional Courts and the European Court of Justice,[10] the Italian Constitutional Court affirmed that restrictions on fundamental rights (i.e., inter alia, the principle of equality of the vote) must withstand balancing and proportionality.

Stressing that Parliament enjoys discretion in choosing an electoral system, the Court held that once the choice is made it is bound its own standard. So, when Parliament chose proportional representation as the principle to govern its seat allocation, the electoral result had to reflect outcome equality. Here, the design of the majority prize did not meet the standard of outcome equality. This echoed the judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht on a similar issue.

This explicit judicial engagement with foreign constitutional jurisprudence is a new experience for the Italian Constitutional Court. Explicit reference to foreign law is very rare, and in most cases it is limited to the legislative form (i.e. only to the legislation of another country).[11]

The Court also offered three justifications for its case-selection of precedents from the German Constitutional Court:

The constitutional orders of Italy and Germany are “homogeneous” and reflect a common core of constitutional principles.
In neither system is the electoral system for the national Parliament enshrined in the Constitution.
The electoral law under review is a PR system.
The explicit citation of foreign constitutional jurisprudence in an institutional case of a leading importance in Italy seems to confirm some general comparative observations.

“While institutional cases are brought before the Court more rarely and are often of a delicate nature because of their political background, at the same time institutional matters are not as densely affected by legislation and are thus more open to interpretation, leaving more spaces for a comparative argument.[12]
For obvious reasons, foreign experience is more likely to be used “to resolve, in a functionalist manner, questions about rights, but this method of use can assist with the resolution of institutional questions as well.”[13]
Citations are more likely to occur in new and complex cases, or, at any rate, “in cases dealing with issues with a potentially important political and social impact.”[14]
Recourse to foreign case law may be used to change consolidated positions, or “it is aimed at redefining constitutional interpretation with respect to consolidated methods and results.”[15]
It remains to be seen whether this explicit citation of foreign judicial precedents represents a new trend for the Italian Constitutional Court.

Suggested Citation: Francesco Duranti, Constitutional Dialogues in Italy, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Jan. 22, 2014, available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2014/01/constitutional-dialogues-in-italy
[1] Italian Constitutional Court, decision no. 1/2014 http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/schedaUltimoDeposito.do;jsessionid=2189053EF162606638BD82D714D008BF (text in Italian, last accessed 21 January 2014).

[2] http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/comunicatiStampa.doc (text in Italian, last accessed 21 January 2014).

[3] The very complex electoral systems for both Houses of Parliament (it is PR in principle, but with various electoral thresholds and with the decisive, aforementioned, majority prize) is not the object of this brief note. For a quick synthesis, see http://electionresources.org/it/ (last accessed 21 January 2014).

[4] It is to be noted that the majority prize (340 seats of 630 total seats of the Lower House, i.e. 55% of it) is attributed to the party (or to the coalition of parties) that wins (nationwide) a simple majority of the votes, without a minimum electoral threshold. So, it is theoretically possible that an election could produce an outcome where 9 parties gain almost 10% of the votes, and party 10 gains 10% plus one vote. Under this scenario, party 10 would wins the majority prize of 55% of the House seats (!).

[5] On this competence of the Court and on its substantial and procedural limits, see http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/pdf/Cc_Checosa_2013_UK.pdf (last accessed 21 January 2014).

[6] This is the first time the Italian Constitutional Court has declared unconstitutional the electoral law for the national Parliament.

[7] S. Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism. Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2013.

[8] M. Tushnet, The rise of weak-form judicial review, in T. Ginsburg, R. Dixon (eds.), Comparative Constitutional Law, Edward Elgar, 2011, 326.

[9] On this judgment, see C. Tomuschat, Germany’s Mixed-Member Electoral System: A Victim of its Sophistication? (2012), German Law Journal, vol. 13, no. 5, at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol14-No1/PDF_Vol_14_No_1_213-238_Developments_Tomuschat.pdf (last accessed 21 January 2014).

[10] On the migration of proportionality, see A. Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 181 ff.

[11] Quantitative studies show that citations of foreign law in the judgments of the Italian Constitutional Court are limited in comparison with other Constitutional Courts: “it should be noted that these references are nearly always to statute law rather than a case law,” G.F. Ferrari, A. Gambaro, The Italian Constitutional Court and Comparative Law. A Premise (2010), Comparative Law Review, vol. 1, n. 1, 4, at http://www.comparativelawreview.com/ojs/index.php/CoLR/article/view/3/7 (last accessed 21 January 2014).

[12] T. Groppi, M.C. Ponthoreau, Conclusion. The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges: A Limited Practice, An Uncertain Future, in T. Groppi, M.C. Ponthoreau (eds.), The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges, Hart Publishing, 2013, 417.

[13] C. Saunders, Judicial engagement with comparative law, in T. Ginsburg, R. Dixon (eds.), Comparative Constitutional Law, Edward Elgar, 2011, 582.

[14] T. Groppi, M.C. Ponthoreau, op. cit., 430.

[15] G.F. Ferrari, A. Gambaro, op. cit., 22. See also G. Halmai, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, in M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, 1333.


Fonte: blog Supremo Tribunal Federal em Debate

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